2014年3月全球 （未完成）

2014年3月全球

Why China Can’t Innovate
And What It’s Doing About It
中国无法创新的原因和破解之道

The Chinese invented gunpowder, the compass, the waterwheel, paper money, long-distance banking, the civil service, and merit promotion. Until the early 19th century, China’s economy was more open and market driven than the economies of Europe. Today, though, many believe that the West is home to creative business thinkers and innovators, and that China is largely a land of rule-bound rote learners—a place where R&D is diligently pursued but breakthroughs are rare.
　　　中国人发明了火药、指南针、水车、纸币、银票、公务员和奖励晋升制度（科举制度？）。与欧洲经济体相比，中国的经济更加开放，更以市场为导向，这种情况一直持续到19世纪初。不过在今天，许多人认为西方才是创新业务思想家和创新者的发源地，中国在很大程度上已成为死记硬背者的乐土，在这里，尽管研发是人们孜孜追求的目标，但突破并不常见。
　　　
　　　When we ask why, the answers vary. Some people blame the engineers. “Most Chinese start-ups are not founded by designers or artists, but by engineers who don’t have the creativity to think of new ideas or designs,” argues Jason Lim, an editor at the website TechNode.
　　　当我们询问个中原因，答案五花八门。有些人归咎于工程师。TechNode网站的编辑杰森·林（Jason Lim）认为，“中国大多数初创企业不是由设计师或艺术家创立的，而是由工程师建立的，他们不具备创造性，想不出新点子或新设计。”
　　　
　　　Others blame the government for the unprecedented scale of its failure to protect intellectual property rights. Apple’s products have been pirated the world over, they point out, but only China has opened entirely fake Apple stores filled with employees who think they work for the U.S. company
　　　另一些人则指责政府对知识产权保护不利，致使侵权事件的规模前所未有。他们指出，在世界各地，盗版苹果产品屡见不鲜，但只有在中国，冒牌苹果商店遍地开花，店内员工还认为自己在为美国公司工作。
　　　
　　　Still others blame the Chinese education system, with its modernized version of what the Japanese scholar Ichisada Miyazaki calls “China’s examination hell.”How can students so completely focused on test scores possibly be innovators?
　　　还有一部分人抱怨中国的教育体系，其现代版本被日本学者宫崎市定（Ichisada Miyazaki）称为“中国的考试地狱。 ”学生们把全部精力倾注于考试成绩，怎么可能成为创新者？
　　　
　　　From our decades of field experience and research in China, and the dozens of case studies we have collectively produced, we see some merit in all those views (but we must point out that many of the most innovative Western firms were founded by engineers). Those criticisms don’t tell the entire story, however. China has no lack of entrepreneurs or market demand. And given the government’s enormous wealth and political will, China has the potential to set the kind of economic policies and build the kind of education and research institutions that propelled the U.S. to technological dominance. But will that potential be realized? We see considerable challenges.
　　　我们在中国有着几十年的实地经验和研究，共同制作过几十项案例研究资料，从中可以看到，上述这些意见均有可取之处（但我们必须指出的是，许多最具创新能力的西方公司是由工程师创办的）。不过，这些批评无法揭示整个故事的全貌。中国不乏企业家或市场需求，而且，既然政府已投入了巨额财富，表现出强烈的政治决心，那么，中国有可能制定出一系列经济政策，构建一些教育和科研机构，以前美国正是依靠这些措施成长为科技强国。但是，这种潜力能否变为现实？在我们看到，面临的挑战相当巨大。
　　　
　　　A look at how innovation is happening in China—from the top down, from the bottom up, through acquisition, and through education—sheds light on the complexities of the issue, highlighting the promise and the problems China faces in its quest to become the world’s innovation leader.
　　　自上而下、自下而上、收购创新、教育创新……通过总览创新在中国的发展现状，人们可以了解到这一问题的复杂性，尤其是对中国寻求成为全球创新领导者的前景和所面临的问题有更深的认识。
　　　
　　　Innovation from the Top Down
　　　自上而下的创新
　　　
　　　In its 2006 “Medium- to Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology” (MLP), the Chinese government declared its intention to transform China into “an innovative society” by 2020 and a world leader in science and technology by 2050. That was not empty talk. Beijing has a solid track record of setting policies and incentives, and then watching citizens and local government officials, right down to the village level, fall in line with them.
　　　在2006年颁布的《国家中长期科学和技术发展规划纲要》（MLP）中，中国政府明确指出，将在2020年把中国基本转变为“创新型社会”，2050年实现科技强国。这不是一句空话。可靠的跟踪记录显示，北京已经制定了一些政策和激励机制，接着要监督市民和当地政府官员，直到村一级组织，保证上下协调一致。
　　　
　　　For nearly 40 years, in fact, the Chinese government has been using its wealth of funds and political will to stimulate innovation from the top. In the 1980s and 1990s, China created the National Natural Science Foundation and the State Key Laboratory program, and revamped its Soviet-style Chinese Academy of Sciences to fund precommercial university research on a peer reviewed (rather than a political) basis, in much the same way that the National Science Foundation does in the United States. At the same time, the state, with support from regional governments, financed the development of high-tech zones to further innovation commercialization. Since 1985, when the first such zone was developed, in Shenzhen, they have proliferated to the point where they are a common stop on official tours of any major Chinese city.
　　　事实上近40年来，中国政府一直在运用财政资金和政治意愿，自上而下地刺激创新。20世纪80年代和90年代，中国设立了国家自然科学基金和国家重点实验室计划，并对苏联模式下的中国科学院进行了改造，以便在同行评审（而非政治）基础上，为商业活动前的大学研究提供资金支持，这与美国的国家科学基金会的运作方式如出一辙。与此同时，国家在地区政府的支持下，资助高新区进一步朝着创新商业化的方向发展。自1985年以来，当第一个高新区在深圳成立后，这种扶持资金的规模激增，中国主要城市的公款旅游因此被普遍叫停。
　　　
　　　The power of the government to shape nascent innovative industries can be seen in the effects of its policies on the wind turbine industry. In 2002 the government launched an open bidding process for wind farm projects to encourage competition among turbine makers. Foreign imports soon flooded China’s fledgling market. Ina pattern that it would repeat in other industries, the government then required state-owned enterprises to source 70% of their components from domestic firms. Foreign firms continued to invest directly in China, but by 2009 six of the top 10 wind turbine firms were Chinese. This capped off a remarkable growth spurt in domestic firms’ share of total sales, from 51% in 2006 to 93% in 2010.
　　　政府塑造新兴创新产业的力量之大，从政策对风电产业的影响上可见一斑。2002年政府发起了一项风电场公开招标项目，鼓励风机制造商展开竞争。国外进口产品很快在尚未成熟的中国市场泛滥开来。仿照其他行业的模式，政府要求在国有企业的采购中，国内企业的产品应占70％。外国公司继续在中国直接投资，但到2009年6月，在排名前10位的风电企业中，6家归中国人所有，促使国内企业的产品销量在全行业总销售额的占比呈现井喷式增长，从2006年的51％一跃升至2010年的93％。
　　　
　　　The aim of the 2006 MLP was to reduce China’s reliance on imported technology to no more than 30% within a few years, to increase domestic R&D funding, and to leapfrog foreign rivals in what the government identified as “strategic emerging sectors,” among them biotechnology, energy-efficient technologies, equipment manufacturing, information technology, and advanced materials. To that end, the Chinese government introduced export subsidies for Chinese firms and a policy requiring government ministries and state-owned businesses to procure goods, when feasible, from Chinese-owned companies. Despite objections that those moves violate the terms of China’s membership in the World Trade Organization, few international firms have left, instead resigning themselves to supporting innovation within China.
　　　依据2006年《国家中长期科学和技术发展规划纲要》的目标，在短短几年内，要将中国对进口技术的依赖降低到不超过30％，以增加国内研发资金，在政府确定的“战略型新兴产业”（即生物技术、节能技术、装备制造、信息技术和先进材料）超越国外竞争对手。为了完成这项目标，中国政府出台为中国公司引入了出口补贴，并出台政策，要求政府部门和国有企业在可行的情况下，从中国企业采购货物。尽管有反对意见认为这些举措违反了中国加入世界贸易组织的条款，但极少有国际公司离开中国，相反的，他们选择妥协，在中国境内支持创新。
　　　
　　　There is perhaps no more potent demonstration of China’s ability to set, and often realize, ambitious goals than the government’s backing of high-speed rail and efforts to put humans on the moon, both massive projects that require funding on a scale seemingly impossible in the West and an ability to invent and adapt numerous technologies. We believe such ambitions could jump-start innovation in much the same way that government-funded programs did in the United States in the second half of the 20th century. 
　　　似乎没有更多证据显示中国有能力设立、并经常能够实现远大的目标，除了政府支持的高铁和登月项目之外，而这两项重大工程都需要庞大的资金后盾（即使在西方，恐怕也力不从心），以及发明和改进大量技术的能力。我们相信，雄心勃勃的中国政府将会大力推动创新事业的迅速发展，就像美国政府20世纪下半叶在政府资助项目上所做的那样。
　　　
　　　Innovation from the Bottom Up
　　　自下而上的创新
　　　
　　　There are limits, though, to what even so muscular and motivated a government as China’s can mandate when it comes to innovation. Against the government’s intentions and national resources run powerful currents that originate in China’s Communist system and ancient culture. 
　　　不过，在中国强制实施创新之际，即使是坚强有力、满怀信心的政府也难免有力所不能及的地方。在政府意愿和国家资源之外，中国的共产主义制度和古老文化也生发出一股洪流，发挥着强有力的作用。
　　　
　　　Consider how those forces can constrain the entrepreneurial creativity bubbling up in China. In the early 1990s Edward Tian (Tian Suning), a U.S.-educated entrepreneur, founded the telecom start-up AsiaInfo (now AsiaInfo-Linkage), which within three years grew into a thriving company of 320 people with revenue of $45 million.
　　　我们不妨思考一下，在中国，这些力量是如何束缚企业创造力的。在20世纪90年代初，留学美国的田溯宁（Tian Suning）创办了电信初创企业亚信公司（即现在的亚信联创），蓬勃发展，三年内成长为320名员工、收入4500万美元的公司。
　　　
　　　In 1996, frustrated with the slow pace of technological change in China’s telecommunications industry, then–vice premier Zhu Rongji convinced Tian that it was his duty to leave AsiaInfo in order to lead a new company, China Netcom, as it set out to build a fiber-optic network linking some 300 cities. When one of us (McFarlan) visited the company, in 2001, it was an innovative firm with an open, creative culture, despite the fact that it was jointly owned by four government agencies. 
　　　1996年，由于对中国电信业的技术变革步伐缓慢感到失望，当时的国务院副总理朱镕基说服田书宁离开亚信，去领导一个新公司中国网通，目标是构建一个光纤网络，连接约300个城市。2001年当我们中的一个人（麦克法兰）参观该公司时发现，这是一家创新型公司，拥有开放的创意文化，尽管它是由四家政府机构共同所有的。
　　　
　　　In 2002, when the telecommunications giant China Telecom was broken apart by the government, its 10 northern provincial markets were integrated into China Netcom. Overnight, Tian became responsible for an organization of 230,000. 
　　　2002年，当电信巨头中国电信被政府拆分后，该公司在北方10省的市场被整合到中国网通旗下。一夜之间，田溯宁要负责管理23万家企业。
　　　
　　　The culture clash between the two organizations was extraordinary. Tian was seen by many China Telecom employees as an American outsider trying to reform a state owned enterprise in unacceptable ways. Six months after the merger, McFarlan presented our case study on China Netcom to 70 senior Chinese executives, including 20 from the telecom industry. Rather than draw lessons from the case about the relationship between organizational change and business success, the group attacked Tian for his “un-Chinese” ways of managing— and then charged McFarlan with incompetence for presenting Silicon Valley culture in China in such a positive light. Tian soon stepped down from his CEO role and later from the China Netcom board.
　　　两个组织之间的文化冲突异乎寻常地激烈。田溯宁被许多中国电信员工视为来自美国的外人，企图用不可接受的方式改造国有企业。合并半年后，麦克法兰把我们所做的中国网通案例拿给70名中国高层管理人员看，其中包括20名电信从业人员。这些人非但没有从案例中组织变革和商业成功之间的关系中学有所得，反而集体攻击田溯宁，认为他的管理方式不够“中国化”，同时指责麦克法兰没有从积极的角度呈现中国背景下的硅谷文化。田溯宁很快辞去了在中国网通的CEO职位，后来又退出了董事会。
　　　
　　　To outsiders, China Netcom eventually looked like a modern telecom firm, with the governance structures needed to be listed on international stock exchanges. But it remained at heart a state-owned enterprise. When we teach our current case on China Netcom, we ask MBA students to scour the company’s board for the real boss. Where, we ask, is the party secretary? The Communist *** requires a representative to be present in every company with more than 50 employees. Every firm with more than 100 employees must have a party cell, whose leader reports directly to the party in the municipality or province. These requirements compromise the proprietary nature of a firm’s strategic direction, operations, and competitive advantage, thus constraining normal competitive behavior, not to mention the incentives that drive founders to grow their own businesses. 
　　　在外人看来，由于要在国际证券交易所上市，在公司治理结构方面，中国网通最终看起来很像一个现代化的电信公司。但它的核心仍不失为一家国有企业。当我们在讲授当前的中国网通案例时，要求MBA学生找出该公司董事会的真正老板。我们会问，党委书记在哪里？***要求，在每一家员工人数超过50名的企业里，都要有一名党代表；每一家超过100名员工的企业，都要有一个党组织，其领导人直接向所在省市的党组织汇报。这些要求削弱了公司战略方向、运营的所有者属性，也减少了竞争优势，从而限制了正常的竞争行为，更挫伤了企业创办人发展壮大自有企业的积极性。
　　　
　　　But even if the government were to disband party cells and instead redouble its efforts to encourage breakthrough innovation, there remains an even stronger disincentive: the economic realities of the markets in which Chinese companies operate. Why go to the trouble to pioneer innovative offerings when the rewards and growth prospects for incremental improvements are so vast, both at home and abroad? 
　　　但是，即使政府解散党组织，加倍鼓励创新突破，一个更为强大的抑制力依然存在，那就是中国企业经营所在市场的经济现实。无论在国内国外，如果渐进式改良的奖励和增长前景如此巨大，为什么还要费尽心机地开拓创新产品？
　　　
　　　Consider the B2B portal Alibaba, which in 2001 was so shaky that we feared it would go bankrupt. But by creatively adapting foreign technologies to the needs of developing markets, Alibaba now serves 80 million customers in nearly 250 countries. The success of its auction website, Taobao, eventually forced eBay out of China. Or take Baidu, the Chinese search engine leader, which has grown massively in its home market with an offering that breaks no technological ground and does not challenge political orthodoxy. Having tailored its product, organization, and processes to the needs of China’s patchwork of regional markets, Baidu now has an 80% share of what has become the world’s largest search market.
　　　想一想B2B门户阿里巴巴，这家网站在2001年摇摇欲坠，让人担心它会破产。但是，通过创造性地改进国外技术，使其满足发展中市场的需求，阿里巴巴目前在近250个国家为8000万客户提供服务，旗下的拍卖网站淘宝最终成功将eBay逼出中国。或以百度为例，作为中国搜索引擎的领导企业，尽管从无任何技术突破，依靠顺应政治正统，这家公司在国内市场大幅成长。为满足中国区域市场的不同需要，量身定做产品、组织和流程，百度目前在世界上最大的搜索市场占有80％的份额。
　　　
　　　Just as Japan caught up with the United States technologically in many industries during the three decades after World War II, China is now doing the same through incremental innovations. Adapting technology has become a standard and highly lucrative practice. Getting that technology through acquisitions, though, is an important new trend. 
　　　正如在二战后的三十年中日本在很多行业的技术赶上了美国，中国正在通过渐进式创新做着同样的事。改进技术已经成为一种收益丰厚的标准做法。不过，通过收购获得技术则是不可忽视的新趋势。
　　　
　　　Innovation by Acquisition
　　　通过收购实施创新
　　　
　　　Much has been written about the current wave of Chinese overseas direct investment, most of which has focused on commodity resources, particularly in Africa and Latin America. The turn toward the United States and Europe for technology, however, is no less significant. Tired of paying licensing fees and royalties, Chinese firms have increasingly, and with their government’s encouragement, sought to buy, rather than rent (or steal), breakthrough innovation capabilities through acquisitions of both technology and talent. 
　　　媒体上已经多次对中国企业海外直接投资热潮有所报道，其中大部分投资集中在商品资源，尤其是在非洲和拉丁美洲。对美国和欧洲的技术投资同样不可小觑。中国企业越来越厌倦了支付许可费和专利费，与政府的鼓励下，他们寻求通过收购技术和人才，达到购买而非租用（或窃取）突破性创新能力的目的。
　　　
　　　Take the case of Huawei. William Plummer, the company’s Washington, DC–based vice president for external affairs and a former U.S. diplomat, once portrayed the telecom powerhouse as “the biggest company you’ve never heard of,” a claim few would make today, especially given its 16 R&D centers around the world and the controversies regarding its acquisition attempts in the United States.
　　　以华为为例。该公司华盛顿特区对外事务副总裁、美国前外交官威廉·普拉默（William Plummer）曾将这家电信公司描绘为“你从未听说过的最大公司”，尤其是考虑到该公司在全世界设立了16家研发中心，他们在美国的收购意图引发多次争议，现在几乎没人会讲这种大话。
　　　
　　　Haier, a leading Chinese appliance and consumer electronics manufacturer, has a similarly wide network of global design and R&D centers in the United States, Japan, Korea, Italy, the Netherlands, and Germany. For Chinese auto manufacturers, Turin, Italy, is the place to be, with JAC, FAW, and Chang’an operating R&D centers there.
　　　海尔是中国领先的家电和消费电子产品制造商，拥有同样广泛的全球设计和研发中心网络，遍及美国、日本、韩国、意大利、荷兰和德国。对于江淮汽车、一汽、长安等中国汽车制造商来说，研发中心必须设在意大利都灵。
　　　
　　　Anti-Western cultural currents may be strong at home, but private Chinese firms operating overseas have embraced local senior talent. Plummer, for example, is hardly the only high-ranking Westerner who has worked at Huawei. In 2010 the company recruited John Roese, the former chief technology officer of Nortel, to lead the company’s North American R&D efforts, and a year earlier former British Telecom CTO Matt Bross was brought in to oversee Huawei’s entire $2.5 billion R&D budget and operations. Both had reported directly to Huawei’s founder and chairman, Ren Zhengfei, a former Chinese military officer. Similarly, turbine manufacturer Goldwind recruited American Tim Rosenzweig, an established figure in the clean-energy field, to serve as the first CEO of its U.S. operations. He in turn brought in executives with records distinguished by cross-cultural experience and industrial expertise.  
　　　尽管国内的反西方文化潮流可能还很强劲，但在海外经营的中国民营企业已经开始接受当地的高级人才。例如普拉默肯定不是唯一一位在华为打工的西方高级人才。2010年该公司聘请了曾经担任北电网络（Nortel）前首席技术官的约翰·罗伊斯（John Roese），领导该公司在北美的研发业务，此前一年，英国电信首席技术官马特·布罗斯（Matt Bross）加入华为，监管该公司总共25亿美元的研发预算和运营。他们都直接向华为创始人兼董事长任正非汇报，后者曾在中国军队服役。同样的，风机制造商金风科技（Goldwind）聘请了美国人蒂姆·罗森茨维格（Tim Rosenzweig），罗森茨维格是清洁能源领域的标志性人物，曾是该公司负责美国业务运营的首任CEO 。他又带来了几位在跨文化体验和行业专业知识方面卓有建树的高级管理人才。
　　　
　　　Machinery manufacturer Sany, whose main international competitors include Caterpillar and Komatsu, initially attempted to succeed in the European and U.S. markets by relying on homegrown talent and technology. But a few missteps encouraged the firm to establish R&D centers closely tied to its European and U.S. regional headquarters and to staff them with professionals from those countries. And Sany’s 2012 acquisition of Putzmeister, Germany’s leading cement pump maker, gave the company access to a onetime competitor’s technology. 
　　　机械制造商三一重工的主要国际竞争对手包括卡特彼勒和小松，最初，该公司曾试图依靠本土人才和技术在欧洲和美国市场取得成功。但几次失误促使该企业在与欧洲和美国地区总部紧密相连的地点建立研发中心，并就地使用这些国家的专业人士。2012年三一重工收购了德国著名水泥泵制造商普茨迈斯特（Putzmeister），从曾经的竞争对手手中获得了大量的技术。
　　　
　　　In short, we see Chinese firms *** a concerted—and effective—effort to fill major gaps in their innovation capacity through increasingly widespread foreign acquisitions and partnerships. 
　　　简言之，我们看到中国企业正在进行协调一致、富有成效的努力，通过日益广泛的收购和合作，填补创新能力上的重大空白。
　　　
　　　Still, to become a leading force for innovation in the 21st century, the Chinese need to be nurturing the innovators of the future. That is the job of Chinese universities. 
　　　不过，要成为21世纪的创新主导力量，中国还需要培育未来的创新者。这是中国大学的职责。
　　　
　　　Innovation Through the Next Generation
通过下一代实现创新

　　　In the first half of the 20th century, China developed strong state-run institutions (Peking University, Jiao Tong University, National Central University, and, at the apogee of research, the Academia Sinica). These were accompanied by a creative set of private colleges and universities (Yenching University, St. John’s University and Peking Union Medical College, to name but a few). All were Sovietized in the 1950s and destroyed in the political turmoil of the Cultural Revolution.
　　　在20世纪上半叶，中国建立了强大的国营高校（如北京大学、交通大学，国立中央大学，并设立了最高研究机构——中国科学院）。与此同时，一系列具有创造性的民办高校应运而生（仅举几例，如燕京大学、圣约翰大学和北京协和医学院）。但上述所有院校均在20世纪50年代被苏维埃化，并在文革的政治动荡中损失殆尽。
　　　
　　　Now Chinese universities are back. Take Tsinghua University. It was founded in 1911 with American-returned funds from the Boxer Indemnity as a two-year liberal arts college to prepare students for study in the United States. It became a comprehensive university in Nationalist times (John Fairbank, the founder of modern Chinese studies in the United States, learned his Chinese history there in the 1930s) and a Soviet-style polytechnic university in the 1950s. It is now reclaiming its place as a great comprehensive university—more difficult to get into than Harvard or Yale. In 2016 Tsinghua will open its first truly international college—Schwarzman College, named for the U.S. donor Stephen A. Schwarzman—to 200 postgraduate students annually from around the world. The Schwarzman Scholars who reside there will, Tsinghua believes, be the Rhodes Scholars of the 21st century.
　　　现在，中国的大学东山再起。以清华大学为例。该校成立于1911年，是用美国退还的庚子赔款建立的，原本是一座为期两年的文科大学，是专为留学美国的学生提供的预备学校，民国时期发展成为综合性大学（费正清是现代中国研究在美国的创始人，20世纪30年代他在这里学过中国历史），并在20世纪50年代演变为苏联式的理工大学。目前，该校重新回归成为大型综合性大学，比哈佛或耶鲁更难考进。2016年清华开设了首家真正意义上的国际化大学——施瓦茨曼学院，以美国捐赠者斯蒂芬·施瓦茨曼（Stephen A. Schwarzman）的名字命名，每年招收200名研究生，学生来自世界各地。清华大学相信，现在在那里居住的施瓦茨曼学者会将成为21世纪的罗德学者。
　　　
　　　Simply in terms of the number of students educated, the recent changes in China’s postsecondary education system are more dramatic than even the great postwar expansion of higher education in the United States or the growth of massenrollment universities in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s. After a decade in which most were shuttered, in 1978 Chinese universities opened their doors to fewer than 1 million students. By 1998 enrollment had reached 3.4 million, far short of the 14.5 million attending in the United States.
　　　但从接受教育的学生数量而言，相比美国高等教育的战后扩张或20世纪70、80年代欧洲众多大学入学人数的增加，近来中国在中学后教育体系上的变化更为显著。文革十年大多数院校都关门之后，1978年中国的大学向不到100万学生敞开大门。到1998年入学人数已经达到了340万，远远低于美国的1450万。
　　　
　　　Private colleges and universities now account for more than a quarter of all higher education institutions in China, and they are growing at a faster rate than public ones. Large companies are also getting involved. Alibaba’s Taobao unit, for instance, has established Taobao University, initially to train e-business owners, managers, and salespeople. In time it will offer business education to more than a million online students.
　　　目前，民办高校在中国所有高等教育机构中所占比例已超过四分之一，与公立院校相比，他们正在以更快的速度发展。大公司也越来越多地加入其中。例如阿里巴巴旗下的淘宝网建立了淘宝大学，初步培养电子商务企业所有者、管理者和销售人员。随着时间的推移，它将会为超过一百万在线学生提供商业教育。
　　　
　　　
　　　
　　　
　　　
　　　
　　　
　　　
　　　China will soon turn out more PhDs each year than any other country in the world, as Chinese universities aim to be cradles of high-level, creative research and forces capable of transforming research and innovation into higher productivity. The Chinese government and many other sources are pumping enormous revenues into the leading institutions. Within 10 years, the research budgets of China’s elite universities will approach those of their U.S. and European peers. And in engineering and science, Chinese universities will be among the world’s leaders.
　　　 中国每年将很快变成更多的博士比世界上任何其他国家，如中国大学的目标是成为高层次，创造性的研究和能力转化的研究和创新转化为更高的生产力势力的摇篮。中国政府和许多其他来源都抽了巨大的收入进入领导机构。在10年内，中国的精英大学的研究经费将接近那些他们在美国和欧洲的同行。并在工程和科学，中国的大学将成为世界领导者之一。

　　　 Will Chinese universities set global standards in the 21st century? It is possible (even though none currently ranks in the global top 50) simply because of the resources they are likely to have. But the more important question is whether China has a good institutional framework for innovation.
　　　将中国的大学建立全球标准在21世纪？这是因为他们很可能拥有的资源仅仅可能（即使没有目前排名在全球前50名） 。但更重要的问题是，中国是否有创新的一个很好的制度框架。

　　　Our answer at present is no. The governance structures of China’s state-owned universities still leave too many decisions to too few, too self-important, people. Chinese universities, like state-owned enterprises, are plagued with party committees, and the university party secretary normally outranks the president. While a few extraordinary party secretaries are central to their universities’ success, as a rule this system of parallel governance limits rather than enhances the flow of ideas. 
　　　   我们目前的答案是否定的。中国的国有大学的治理结构仍然留下太多的决定，太少，太自我的重要，人。中国的大学，像国有企业，都在困扰着党委和高校党委书记常级别高于总统。虽然有少数非凡的党委书记是中央对他们的大学的成功，作为一项规则的平行治理限制这个系统，而不是增强了思想交流。
　　　
　　　The freedom to pursue ideas wherever they may lead is a precondition for innovation in universities. But by any comparative measure, faculty members in Chinese institutions have little or no role in governance. Indeed, it was not a good sign when China’s then–vice president (now president), Xi Jinping, visited China’s leading universities in June 2012 to call for increased party supervision of higher education.
　　　追求思想的地方，他们可能会导致自由是创新的大学的一个先决条件。但是，任何衡量标准，教师在中国的机构在治理很少或根本没有作用。事实上，这不是一个好兆头，当中国当时的副总裁（现为总裁） ，习近平参观了中国的一流大学在2012年6月呼吁高等教育的增加党内监督。
　　　
　　　Perhaps absolute innovation, like absolute leadership and power, is overvalued. In industry, as in education, China can enjoy for some time what Joseph Schumpeter called the latecomer’s advantage: the ability to learn from and improve on the work of one’s immediate predecessors. 
　　　也许是绝对的创新，如绝对领导和权力，被高估。在工业领域，如教育，中国可以享受一段时间什么约瑟夫·熊彼特所谓的后发优势：学习和提高一个人的直接前辈的工作的能力。
　　　
　　　Certainly, China has shown innovation through creative adaptation in recent decades, and it now has the capacity to do much more. But can China lead? Will the Chinese state have the wisdom to lighten up and the patience to allow the full emergence of what Schumpeter called the true spirit of entrepreneurship? On this we have our doubts. 
　　　当然，中国已经表明，通过创新的创意改编近几十年来，它现在必须做更多事情的能力。但中国领导？请问中国政府有足够的智慧减仓和耐心，允许什么熊彼特所谓的企业家精神的真正精神全面崛起？关于这一点，我们有我们的疑虑。
　　　
　　　The problem, we think, is not the innovative or intellectual capacity of the Chinese people, which is boundless, but the political world in which their schools, universities, and businesses need to operate, which is very much bounded 
这个问题，我们认为，是不是中国人，这是无限的创新或知识能力，但政治世界中，他们的学校，大学和企业需要进行操作，这是非常有界


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Creating Leaders Through the Liberal Arts
建立领导通过文科

　　　The Chinese have come to believe the mantra of many American colleges that the best leaders are those with the broadest education in the liberal arts. The goal of a liberal education is not to train specialists but to educate the whole person to be curious, thoughtful, and skeptical.  
　中国人开始相信许多美国大学，最好的领导者是那些拥有最广泛的教育在文科的口头禅。自由教育的目标不是培养专家，但要教育整个人会好奇，周到，持怀疑态度。
　
　Today all Peking University students, even in its GuanghuaSchool of Management, take multiple courses in the liberal arts, including literature, philosophy, and history. The university also boasts an elite liberal arts curriculum in the Yuanpei Program, named for Peking University’s famous German-educated chancellor of the early 20th century, the philosopher Cai Yuanpei. Across the street, Tsinghua’sSchool of Economics and Management has implemented what is perhaps the most imaginative program in liberal arts and general education in any Chinese university.  
　今天，所有的北大学生，甚至在管理其GuanghuaSchool ，采取多种课程，文科，包括文学，哲学，历史。该大学还拥有在元培计划，命名为20世纪初的北京大学著名的德国教育大臣，哲学家蔡元培的精英文科课程。在街对面，经济与管理Tsinghua'sSchool已实施了也许是文科及通识教育在任何中国的大学中最富有想象力的计划。

The most important revolution in Chinese higher education today may not be its size and scope but the fact that even under the leadership of engineers, top institutions have come to understand that an education in the absence of the humanities is incomplete. Perhaps this is because education leaders in China know better than anyone what can happen when a society loses its cultural foundations. This is an education revolution within a revolution, the outcome of which is not yet clear. 
在今天的中国高等教育最重要的革命可能不是它的规模和范围，但事实上，即使是工程师的领导下，顶级机构已经认识到，在没有人文的教育是不完整的。也许这是因为教育的领导人在中国比谁都清楚，当一个社会失去了它的文化根基会发生什么。这是一场革命中的教育革命，它的结果尚不清楚。